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( the Agricultural History Society, 2007 slowly and overworked the land," Mullens nevertheless maintained that the "willing" Italians were "learning quickly." A visiting reporter from Memphis predicted that POW labor "will be used extensively in the Mississippi Delta this Fall to gather the cotton crop." Observers praised the cheerful disposition of the workers, who "regarded the trip to
Clarksdale and the work here as a picnic and sang throughout the day."2
During the summer of 1943, cotton planters across the South con ducted similar experiments with POW farm labor. Allied advances in Europe and North Africa had spurred a massive influx of German and Italian POWs to the continental United States. Ultimately, the home front hosted nearly four hundred thousand Axis prisoners-of-war during World War II, and two-thirds of this predominantly German population spent time in southern camps. As the war effort lured millions of rural workers into military service and defense work, many anxious employ ers turned to enemy captives for relief from an increasingly elusive labor supply. While Axis prisoners worked in factories and lumber camps across the South, their strongest impact was in the fields. Prisoners-of war picked everything from peaches to peanuts, and thousands toiled in cotton fields from southern California to the Chesapeake Bay. However, the greatest number of camps and captive workers devoted to a single crop occurred in the cotton counties along the southern stretch of the Mississippi River. Cotton planters in the Delta region of Arkansas, Mis sissippi, and northern Louisiana seized on this wartime window of op portunity and secured around 11,500 war prisoners.3
The thousands of Axis POWs shipped to the southern home front encountered a society in transition. As several historians have argued,
World War II threatened the status quo in the Cotton Kingdom. The largely black workforce that drove the plantation economy of the Deep South seized on new opportunities stimulated by the wartime boom.
African Americans left cotton plantations to join the military, take de fense jobs, or opt for the relative freedom of daily wage labor. As local employers competed for the remaining day laborers, the abysmal wages for chopping and picking cotton began to rise. Historian Pete Daniel notes that rural employers, accustomed to a surplus of cheap labor, "became obsessed with labor supply and control." With the cooperation of local officials, planters employed a variety of strategies to limit black mobility and rising wages, but wartime changes threatened to radically alter southern society.4
The temporary yet timely solution of POW labor provided local planters with another way to sustain an increasingly outmoded agricul tural system. Yet, as historian Morton Sosna points out, scholars of the wartime South have generally treated prisoners-of-war as "an interest ing historical footnote." Those who have paid sustained attention to the topic focus on the camps largely in isolation from the broader context of wartime change. Some historians have noted the undeniable economic impact of POW labor, and a few have even explored the racial ramifi cations of this peculiar episode in southern history. Most, however, ac cept the planter complaints of labor shortages and their embrace of the POW workforce without addressing motivations beyond a basic desire for profit. If historian Nan Woodruff is correct in asserting that "POW labor represented the planters' response to the demands of farm work ers for decent wages," then the existing historical treatment is insuffi cient. Administered in the midst of a war with momentous implications for the American civil rights movement, the POW labor program re vealed hopes and fears for race and labor relations in the postwar South.s During the latter half of the war, the POW labor program helped cotton planters weather wartime turmoil as they continued to modernize their agricultural practices. Consequently, they used their political clout within the federal agricultural bureaucracy to barter for thousands of prisoners from nearby camps. In practice, however, the POW labor program revealed wartime uncertainties that complicated the transition to a less labor-intensive model of cotton production. Even as inexperi enced field hands undercut planter profits, exposed racial anxieties, and undermined racialized notions of work, their presence helped to extend some of the most exploitative practices of southern agriculture. Despite the limited scope and dubious success rate of POW labor, cotton plant ers in the Delta region utilized this temporary workforce to hold a place on the plantation for African Americans.
POW contract labor was neither the first nor the only counterstrategy employed by cotton planters to maintain low wages and preserve their control over local labor. Before the War Department authorized the POW work program in early 1943, cotton planters had already tried a variety of tactics to maintain a ready supply of workers. Initially, they aimed to retain rather than replace their dwindling black workforce. The wartime boom gave many rural African Americans options for escaping the drudgery of the cotton fields. Many entered the military or migrated to the cities to take relatively lucrative jobs in defense industries. As African-American soldiers began to send their pay home to wives and relatives, women and children left the plantations and moved into town. With newfound mobility and independence, even those who remained on the farm could scout around for the best wages and hire themselves out for temporary work.
Many cotton planters resorted to deception, bribery, and intimidation to counter this increasing independence and mobility of black workers. On both sides of the Mississippi River, planters promised to secure draft exemptions for workers who signed lengthy contracts. When workers refused such offers, planters evicted them from the plantation. Planter abuses constituted "a new form of peonage," warned an ally of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU). Formed in Arkansas during the Great Depression, the STFU was a biracial union of sharecroppers and farmworkers with locals throughout the Delta region. From STFU headquarters in Memphis, union co-founder Henry Mitchell kept up a steady barrage of protests against the tactics of area cotton planters.6
Increasing black mobility and outmigration forced cotton planters to look for alternate sources of labor. This strategy was by no means un precedented. Previous generations of Delta planters had attempted to lessen their dependence on black labor by recruiting Chinese and Italian immigrants. While these labor experiments had petered out by the early twentieth century, the demand for Mexican migrant workers increased during the war years despite limited availability in the Delta region. But racial anxieties, heightened by wartime disruption, continued to com plicate the hunt for nontraditional farmworkers. While northern and midwestern farmers successfully recruited migrant labor from the Car ibbean, several island nations refused to send their citizens "south of the Mason-Dixon line" for fear of discrimination. Another potential source of nonnative labor appeared with the construction of two Japanese American internment camps in the Arkansas Delta. However, Gover nor Homer Adkins adamantly opposed Japanese-American labor on explicitly racist grounds, and most whites in the region followed suit.
When cotton planters in the Mississippi Delta inquired about employing interned Japanese Americans, a prominent local banker warned that "instead of having one racial problem we will have two." In northern Louisiana, a prominent planter abandoned plans to recruit tenant farm ers from the nearby internment camps when alarmed local citizens warned that the former California vegetable farmers would "take over the parish."7 In the midst of the scramble for farm labor, the War Department announced that Axis POWs could be used to ease shortages across the country. Following this, Delta planters began an aggressive campaign to secure as many prisoners as possible. When Clarksdale, Mississippi, cot ton planter Paul F. Williams learned that Italian prisoners-of-war had arrived at nearby Camp Como, he devised a plan to gauge "the attitude of the prisoners toward doing such farm work." Williams presented his plan to the Delta Council, an organization of white planters, politicians, and professionals. With the approval of the Delta Council, Williams contacted the commanding officer at Camp Como to request several dozen prisoners to test the feasibility of POW farm labor. While Colonel H. L. Henkle claimed to be "very sympathetic" to the plight of the planters, he initially balked at the idea of sending the Italians nearly sixty miles away. Nevertheless, in late June 1943, Henkle sent sixty POWs to E. J. Mullens's plantation for the first of many days in the cotton fields.8 Delta planters and the local press enthusiastically heralded the "suc cessful experiment" on the Mullens plantation. Despite public praise, the local farm labor committee privately admitted that POWs might be more expensive and less cooperative than local workers. Under the Geneva Convention, the prisoners could only work for an eight-hour POWs, planters and military personnel spent the off-season expanding an extensive network of "branch camps." Local associations of planters pooled their resources to build these makeshift work camps in their towns and counties. "Any group of men in any one community may apply for a prisoner of war camp" announced the Delta Farm Press, "if they want to pay the costs of getting the material here and getting the camp constructed, guarantee 80 percent employment over a period of one year and pay prevailing local wage rates." The military, in turn, would provide administrators, guards, and prisoners.16 From the beginning, cotton interests dominated the contract labor program in the alluvial plains along the Mississippi River. Early in 1944 over one hundred members of the Mississippi County Farm Bureau met in Osceola, Arkansas, to plan a major expansion of POW labor opera tions. Eventually, local planters established six branch camps in this, the nation's top cotton county. In nearby Brinkley, a War Department of ficial reported that "there were plenty of prisoners" and encouraged planters "to rush construction of the camps as fast as possible." When federal officials cut the requested allotment of ten thousand prisoners in half, irate representatives from twenty-nine farmers' associations elected three representatives to take their concerns to Washington. Within a matter of days, the delegates reported that they had success fully lobbied for three thousand extra POWs to help fill the cotton camps of the Arkansas Delta. Planters on the other side of the river failed to establish as many branch camps as their Arkansas neighbors, but the predominance of cotton interests was equally apparent. Follow ing the example of the experimental branch camp in Greenville, Mis sissippi, planters quickly built six more branch camps in five of the top cotton counties in the state. Not to be left out, Louisiana cotton planters erected a handful of camps as well. Although sugar plantations con sumed the majority of the POW manpower in the state, cotton planters in northern Louisiana eventually hosted two thousand war prisoners.17
As the branch camps fanned out across the alluvial plains, the STFU continued its lonely yet vigorous protest from Memphis. When German prisoners entered the cotton fields just across the river in the Arkansas Delta, the STFU claimed that there were as many as five thousand idle workers in Memphis. "With 1,000 prisoners now located in Crittenden County, Arkansas," warned the union's monthly, the Memphis Farm labor." The fact that enemy laborers enjoyed legal advantages over southern farmhands underscored the harsh reality of life on the cotton plantation. But as Mullens's declaration to his POW workers suggests, the racial assumptions of many southern whites made military pro nouncements against worker abuses largely irrelevant.22
Many cotton planters had no intention of subjecting POWs to the harshest conditions of plantation labor. The few who did violated local standards of white privilege. When a planter in Osceola, Arkansas, pushed his German workers too hard, a visiting minister took their complaints to federal officials. Reverend F. W. A. Eiermann reported that the prisoners were "being forced to work ten hours per day in the parching sun." Concerned that many of the men would "fall out and suffer from sun stroke," Eiermann argued that the prisoners should not be required to work the blistering schedule "fixed by the plantation owners who have heretofore employed Negro labor." In a society that had long rationalized the subjugation of African Americans through a racialized division of labor, subjecting fair-skinned men to grueling physical work was a sensitive issue. While many Delta planters regularly hired local white workers, many also continued to make explicitly racial distinctions in their expectations and management of labor. Thus the utilization of white POWs required either an adjustment of prevailing racial assumptions or an extension of special privileges to Axis prison ers. Of course, southern planters knew that no amount of leniency could render the cotton fields a suitable place for "gentlemen." Nevertheless, their refusal to implement "all the supervisory techniques" alluded to by military officials suggests that racial customs often undercut efficiency. 23 The racist practices of the rural South left an indelible impression on many plantation POWs. One of the stated goals of the labor program was to expose citizens of the Axis powers to the American way of life. "Labor Presents America to the Prisoner of War," announced an Army manual for supervisors of war prisoners. "The prisoner of war labor program gives the prisoners a chance to closely observe the average American citizen, the way he lives, the opportunities afforded him in the United States, and his relationships with his government and with his fellow citizens." The military warned that "careless talk about ... our racial problems" could undermine "the opinions the prisoners hold with regard to American life and ideas." But, while the War Department hoped that the labor program would serve as a showcase for American democracy, POWs on southern plantations often learned different les sons. Hein Severloh, a German corporal, was astonished by the plight of the African Americans who picked cotton in the Mississippi Delta.
"They required us to gather 100 lbs. of cotton a day," he remembered, "but of the Blacks, they demanded two or three times more." A self described "agriculturalist," Severloh wondered how anyone could en dure such wretched conditions. "For them it was worse than for us," he noted, describing their homes as "very ugly, very primitive." Seeing that blacks in the cotton fields were "oppressed and truly in misery," Sever loh and other prisoners "tried to explain to them what National Social ism was."24 Although some POWs remembered similar encounters, others ob served that their white supervisors preferred to isolate prisoners from local black workers. "Some Germans," notes historian Morton Sosna, "sensed their employers' uneasiness when local blacks saw so many white men working in the fields." Alfred Andersch, a German deserter and future fiction author, noticed similar practices working in the cotton fields of northeastern Louisiana. In one of his short stories, Andersch alluded to the strict segregation of the plantation workforce. Describing a fictional crew of German cotton pickers, Andersch noted that "even in the distance they saw no Negroes working in the fields; it wasn't thought fitting that Negroes should see white men picking cotton."25
The sight of Aryan "supermen" stooped over in the cotton fields of the Deep South challenged some of the bedrock assumptions of south ern society. On plantations that had previously relied on black labor, the spectacle of white field hands served as an unnerving reminder that the wartime upheaval threatened to turn the social structure on its head. At a time when any deviation from the segregated status quo encountered vigorous resistance, the disruption of traditional labor mores harbored explosive potential. Wartime changes forced southern planters into some uneasy compromises. The POW labor program helped many cot ton planters to continue labor-intensive, low-wage practices in the face of increasing mechanization and outmigration. Yet, at the same time, southern racial customs often ensured that war prisoners enjoyed lighter workloads and better treatment than black workers. harvest, cotton planters in Mississippi County, Arkansas, complained that many of their 2,500 war prisoners had engaged in "petty acts of sabotage" such as dragging cotton sacks through the mud, adding clods of dirt and rocks to their sacks, and pulling whole stalks. "Offenses are enough to worry a farmer to death," reported one supervisor. A county agent in Sunflower County, Mississippi, reported that "the picking and pulling of cotton by German prisoners of war in this area as a rule has been very, very unsatisfactorily [sic] ." Local planters complained that the "trashy" cotton was so full of stalks and mud that it could not be ginned. While frustrated planters admitted that POW workers were "better than no help at all," many agreed that they were "so much worse than any labor they ever used that there can be no comparison." One alarmed local criticized the lenient treatment of German prisoners, sending the Delta Farm Press a photograph of POWs "playing on the levee" with only a "negro truck driver" to supervise them. In response, the editor urged supervisors to get tough with their captive labor crews. "The prisoners of war should be made to work," he declared, "or else."27 Due to the seasonal nature of cotton cultivation, planters struggled to provide consistent daily work for the prisoners. Traditionally, plantation owners relied on a system of partial employment, flooding the fields with farmhands during peak periods of the cotton season. These prac tices, however, conflicted with the military requirements for maximum employment of war prisoners. In many areas of the country, POWs rotated from farm to farm and crop to crop in order to meet the demand for labor. In Louisiana, for example, planters shuttled war prisoners between cotton, rice, and sugar operations. However, in a region pri marily devoted to cotton cultivation, planters often failed to provide "done an excellent job" picking nearly two million pounds "that other wise might have rotted in the fields." Across the river, Arkansas Delta planters declared that "the prisoners have saved the cotton crop."29 Even as planters described their POWs in heroic terms, they openly questioned the patriotism, morality, and intelligence of their black neighbors. As an increasing number of African Americans abandoned debt peonage for wage labor, cotton planters stepped up their criticism.
Contributors to the Delta Farm Press regularly berated local blacks for their refusal to remain on the plantation. One columnist scolded them for being "lazy and wasteful" and claimed that they were proving them selves "unworthy to have good wages." The author of this advice column warned Delta blacks that "even Mrs. Roosevelt is getting out of patience with you." The paper even introduced a section targeted at African
American workers entitled "The Colored People's Messenger." Under this banner, white columnists argued that local blacks were "helping "The Negro must not be allowed to leave the Mississippi Delta," de clared John Lynch from Greenville. According to Lynch, the "Delta economy has always been based upon the Negro and not cotton." Oth ers agreed that southern planters had to finesse the transition to mecha nized farming in order to retain black laborers for the times they needed them. Warning that "mechanized farming is on the verge of depopulat ing the Delta," Lynch argued that planters and regional leaders had to "coordinate the inflow of industry with the rate of displacement." Mod ernization of agriculture, he advised, should only take place when other industries could absorb a displaced and unskilled black labor surplus.
The Delta Farm Press assured its readers that such a scheme would not undermine white supremacy. "While such a plan may work directly toward economic equality between races," noted the editor, "it has noth ing to do with social equality." The sluggish modernization of southern agriculture had allowed the Delta to retain poor black workers, but wartime opportunity threatened to scatter them across the country. Cot ton planters, determined to continue their operations in the face of wartime disruptions, continued to experiment with new labor sources. Nevertheless, visions of a pliable and predominantly black postwar workforce persisted.31 Emboldened by their ability to manipulate federal agricultural poli cies during the war, cotton planters campaigned successfully for a fed eral ceiling on cotton-picking wages for the 1945 harvest. Planters jus tified a wage ceiling using the same rationale that had delivered over ten thousand war prisoners. They claimed that a severe shortage of workers, aggravated by labor recruiters and rising black mobility, was the source of their labor woes. They also maintained the need to modernize their operations gradually. "Without a ceiling," warned National Cotton Council president and Mississippi planter Oscar Johnston, "we will have to rush into mechanization." Lamenting the trend towards wage work, Johnston declared that "we must protect ourselves against the loss of the tenant system altogether." Although thousands of POWs would remain for months after the German surrender, planters realized that their captive work force was picking on borrowed time. Cotton barons hoped to counter the increasing assertiveness of STFU members who were demanding as much as $3.50 per hundred pounds of cotton. During the summer of 1945, Delta planters successfully petitioned the USDA to appoint state wage boards that would oversee hearings and elections in each county regarding the proposed pay cap. In the late summer, the cotton counties of Mississippi and Arkansas established wage ceilings through a series of planter-dominated hearings and referendums. 32 Having devised their plan for a postwar plantation economy, cotton planters looked to their remaining war prisoners to ease the transition.
As the war in Europe ground to a halt, a POW camp inspector in the Deep South reported that "the replacement of Prisoners of War in agriculture ... will constitute a real problem." He warned that the "mi gration of workers now employed in war plants in the larger cities, back to farm work ... will be very slow" due to "harder work, longer hours, and less pay." Months after the German surrender, Arkansas Congress man Ezekiel Chandler Gathings declared that his Delta constituents were "absolutely dependent upon the relief that can be obtained from prisoner-of-war labor." In Mississippi, local agricultural officials la mented the challenge of matching desperate cotton planters with a lim ited supply of war prisoners. "We have about as many applications for prisoners to pick cotton as we have prisoners," declared an exasperated county agent. "Numbers and numbers of farmers come to the office every day and others call us over the phone insisting that they need the prisoners more than anybody they know." While the demand for POW labor remained high, the war prisoner population dwindled in the post war months.33
By the end of 1946, the last of the war prisoners had returned home.
The brief experiment with POW labor was over. Furthermore, planter to sustain profits and predominance, the POW labor program chal lenged southern notions of race and place. This labor replacement scheme reinforced the southern racial hierarchy even as it blurred the color line. German workers were not the perfect placeholders for rural
